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DULCEY B. FOWLER 
Virginia Family Law: Tlle Effect of The 
General Assemblv's 1975 Revisions 
THE legislation concerning domestic relations en-acted in the 1975 session of the Virgin ia General 
Assemhly further liberalized grounds for dissolution 
of marriage, reorganized and redefined more logically 
many grounds for dissolution, and eliminated those 
vestiges of sexual discrimination remaining after the 
1974 amendments. The big news is that the period of 
separation necessary for a no-fault divorce has been 
cut from two years to one year, and that women as 
well as men may now be required to pay not "ali-
mony" but "support and maintenance to the spouse." 
The courts are to determine the level of any such sup-
port and maintenance for a spouse or children by 
taking into consideration six specifically enacted new 
factors actually derived from the prior case law on 
alimony and support. 
Other developments are that former grounds for 
divorce which were based on conditions existing prior 
to marriage are now made impedimenl5 to marriage 
for which annulment rather than divorce may be 
decreed; that the legislation reflects a stricter attitude 
towards underage marriages by making them void 
rather than voidable; and that the Code will now for 
the fir~t lime explicitly ban marriages between indi-
viduab of the same sex. 
Medical And Fonnal Requirements 
Regarding medical and formal requirements for 
marria~e, the new legislation makes few changes. 
Section :20-4 now requires the physician to submit a 
written report to the state whenever evidence of syphi lis 
is found at the time of pre-marital serological testing. 
Section 20-27 is an example of the com prehensive 
changes throughout this new legislation in rendering 
section, sexually neutral in their application. It now 
permits the party celebratin g a marriage to charge 
the partil:s, rather than the husband a lone, a fcc which 
can now be as much as $20 rather than the fanner 
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$10. Meanwhile, Section 20-29 providing for a per-
missive certification to the Commonwealth of a Vir-
f,rinia resident's out-of-state marriage has been re-
pealed. 
Unlawful Marriages 
The legislature has made major and beneficial 
changes to Chapter 3 covering unlawful marriages. 
The revision eliminates the confusion between grounds 
for annulment and grounds for divorce which has long 
been characteristic: of legislation in Virginia and 
many other states. 
(a) Incest. 
First, Section 20-38 covering incestuous marriages 
has been repealed, and the long list of relatives among 
whom marriage was prohibited has now been re-
placed by Section 20-38.1 (b) and (c) which ap-
parently bar marriages only on the basis of blood 
relationship. The old legislation barred some mar-
riages based on relationships created by affinity, but 
the new statute follows almost entirely the suggested 
wording of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act by 
declaring "prohibited" only marriages based on blood 
relationship, except for the special case of adoption. 
Accordingly, marriages are prohibited only between 
"an ance.~tor and descendant, or between a brother 
and sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the 
whole blood or by adoption"; and "an unde and a 
niece or between an aunt and a nephew, whether the 
relationship is by the half or the whole blood." Both 
the decisions to omit from the prohibition the blood 
relationship between cousins and any relationship 
ba~ed on marriage may be due to doubts as to the 
justification for such prohibitions and perhaps in the 
latter case a desire to eliminate reflections of earlier 
sectarian influences on such legislation.1 
(b) Bigamy. 
New subsection 20-38.1 (a) (1) also declares "pro-
hibited" a marriage entered into "prior to the dissolu-
tion of an earlier marriage of one of the parties." 
While the term "prohibited" adopted from the Uni-
form Act might create some confusion as to whether 
bigamous and incestuous marriages are void absolutely 
or voidable only upon judicial decree, any question is 
removed hy the retention of old Section 20-43 which 
makes bigamous marriages absolutely void and by new 
Section 20-45.1 (a) which states that all marriage.~ 
1 Drinan, The J.o ving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 
29 OHIO ST. L. J. 358, 370-71 ( 1968). 
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prohibited by 20-38.1, are void as well. These p~ 
visions indicate a stricter attitude on incestuous mar-
riages, since formerly, under Section 20-45, incestuous 
marriages were merely voidable rather than void. 
However, new Section 20-38.1 (b) makes legitimate 
the children of void marriage.~ involving bigamy and 
incest. 
(c) Nonage and Incapacity. 
Section 20-45, which formerly made voidable 
those marriages involving incest, insanity, or incapacity 
from physical causes, has been repealed, and Section 
20-45.1 ha'i been substituted. It adds to the list of 
void marriages all marriages where one or both 
parties are under 18 and consent has not been ob-
tained as provided by Section 20-48. Sections 20-48 
and 20-49 have been revised to set the minimum age 
for both sexe.<> for marriage at 16, with consent being 
required if either of the parties is under 18.2 Consent 
may be given by either parent; a judge if there is no 
parent or the child has been adjudicated delinquent, 
dependent, or neglected; or the State Department of 
Corrections if the child has been committed to it, but 
not the Welfare Board a~ previously provided. The 
judge of the circuit court for the county or city where 
either party lives may consent, rather than just the 
judge of the court where the female resided, as 
formerly. 
The previous age limits were 18 for boys ami 16 
for girls. However, while lowering the age limit" the 
state has now moved away from the majority rule 
elsewhere and taken a stricter attitude toward.'; en-
forcement of age limits by making marriage.s between 
the age.~ of 16 and 18 void where there is no COIl~cnt. 
Previous Virginia law had made underage marriages 
neither void nor voidable except by the underage 
party. 3 However, new section 20-45.1 (b ) retaim the 
essential rule as to mental incapacity of old 20-45, 
which referred to "insanity," in providing that where 
one party is incapacitated because of "mental illfirrTl-
it)'," the marriage is voidable only. 
(d ) Homosexual M arnage. 
The new Section 20-45.2 declare.<; "prohihited" 
marriages between individuals of the same sex, and, 
hy analoR)' to the treatment of bigamous and in-
2 However, if either party is under 16, the marriagr "ill 
be valid if pregnancy is certified and appropriatf' ' ( 'men! 
obtained. 
3Va. Code Ann. §20-89 ( 1950 ) ; Nu dam v. Nerdam. I fl3 
Va. 681, G8G ( 1943). 
cestuous marriages, it seems clear that any such mar-
riage would be absolutely void. Apparently, the in-
clusion of this Section was believed advisable because 
of the 1971 case of Baker v. Nelson! in which the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the absence 
of a statutory ban on same-sex marriages did not 
indicate that they were statutorily authorized. 
Desertion And Nonsupport 
Chapter 5 of the Code covering desertion and non-
support has been revised with the primary purpose 
of rendering all provi.~ions sexually neutral in their 
operation. Thus, the obligations as well as the benefits 
of ~upport and maintenance of either the other spouse 
or childrcn are extended to both sexes. For instance, 
Section 20-61 formerly made the husband responsible 
for th(~ ~llpport and maintenance of his wife if she 
were in neressitous circumstances but the wife cor-
responding-Iy liable only if the husband were inca-
pacitated due to age or other infirmity. The Section 
now makes the partie.'> equally liable in such circum-
stann',. r n addition to rendering several other sections 
sexu:dly neutral, the word "alimony" has been de-
leted ent irely and "support and maintenance for the 
spou,c" ~lIbstituted. 
Srrtion ~0-88 concerning support of parents by 
children has also !Jeen revised. The age at which such 
dllt\ ariq'~ has heen raised from 17 to 18, and the 
obli~;ltion, and benefits have heen extended so that 
female..; a' well as males are liable. Moreover, the 
fathcr need not be "aged or infirm" in order to be 
enlitkrl to such support. The section has also been 
chall.~cd ~o that the juvcnile and domestic relations 
di>trict ('ourts are g-iven exclusive jurisdiction of parent 
slIppllrt ('a<;es pursuant to the 1973 reorganization of 
the ~tate court system, and the child is now to he rc-
li('\"("(l of the duty of support of parents if the parent is 
"ollj("rwi~e eligible for and is receiving public as-
,i,rall( c or services under a federal or State program." 
Thi.; Ltng-uag-e replaces a previous awkward proviso 
tklt the child's financial resources should not be con-
sidered in determining- his parent's eligibility for 
a"i-;Lulce. 
.. \ , tl) the Revised nifornl Reriprocal Enforcement 
of Sllpport Act, only Section 20-88.22: 3 which pro-
"iek, fur immunity of an obligor from criminal prose-
(iltillli for refusal to answer a question during pro-
('("('din~' ~ \lndcr the Act has heen changed, and it has 
hCI'1I Illade sexually neutral. 
4/1,11...,\' . Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971 ) . 
Divorce, Affirmation And Annulment 
(a) Annulment. 
A~ indicated earlier, Chapter 6 covering divorce, 
affirmation and annulment has been extensively re-
vised. Section 20-89, which provided generally that 
both void and voidable marriages might be decreed 
null hut that an underage marriage could not be 
annulled except at the behest of the party underage 
at the time of marriage, has been repealed. It has 
been replaced by Section 20-89.1 which includes sub-
sections (a) through (d). The Section must be read 
carefully to discover that subsections (a), (c), and 
( d) end with periods and arc therefore independent 
of one another. However, subsection (h ) ends with 
only a semicolon which indicates that it must be read 
together with subsection (c ) in order that the latter 
be interpreted correctly. 
Subsection (a) provides generally that when a mar-
riage is alleged to be void or voidable for any of the 
statutorily specified causes or by virtue of fraud or 
duress, either party may institute a suit for annul-
ment. The subsection thus parallels fairly closely the 
repealed section except that reference~ to new sections 
are incorporated and fraud and dure<;s explicitly in-
troduced into the Code for the first time as marital 
impediments. 
However, subsections (b) and (c) together ac-
complish the incorporation into this annulment sec-
tion of fonner grounds for divorce which covered con-
ditions prior to marriage and were therefore more 
properly cognizahle in annulment suits. Thus, grounds 
for divorce formerly listed as subsections 20-91 (2), 
( 4), (7), and (8 ) dealing with impotence, prior con-
viction, pregnancy of wife by another man, and pre-
vious prostitution of the wife, have not only been 
transferred to the annulment section but rendered 
sexually neutral in the proce<;s. Accordingly, annul-
ment can now he decreed where the husband, without 
knowledge of the wife, has fathered a child born to 
another woman within ten months after the date of 
the marriage or where either party has been, without 
the other'~ knowledge, a prostitute. 
In keeping with the prior treatment of these im-
pediments as grounds for divorce, subsection (d) 
provides that there shall he no annulment on the basis 
of any of these four impediments if the party seeking 
annulment has cohabited with the other after knowl-
edge of the relevant facts or in any ca~e where the 
annulment is not sought within a two year period 
after the marriage. This subsection ha~ obviated the 
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need for old Section 20-92 covering the same subject 
when these impediments were treated as divorce 
grounds, and it has been repealed. 
Subsection (d) of 20-89.1 raises a question of 
interpretation. In line with the old section 20-89, it 
provides that an annulment on the grounds of nonage 
cannot be granted to the party who was of the proper 
age at the time of the marriage. This provision was 
logical under the old legislation where the marriage 
was treated a~ valid until and unless the party under-
age at the time had it nullified by court decree. How-
ever, new Section 20-45.1 makes such marriages void 
as noted earlier. If the term is intended to be used in 
the usual sense of absolute invalidity, then the party 
marrying an underage person is prohibited from ob-
taining a judicial declaration that his supposed mar-
riage never in fact existed at all. Since this party 
could validly marry another person it would seem to 
be in his and the public's interest to allow judicial 
clarification of his supposed marriage as in the case 
of all other void marriages as provided by subsection 
20-89. 1 (a) . 
(b) Divorce and Support and Maintenance. 
Section 20-91 which enumerates grounds for abso-
lute divorce has been clarified by the deletion of the 
former grounds now made impediments to marriage 
and incorporated into Section 20-89. 1. Other than 
those deletions, there are four rather important 
changes. The first ground which includes adultery, 
sodomy, and buggery now has been modified to in-
clude only sodomy and huggery committed outside 
the marriage. Thi.~ change is in line with the general 
philosophy that sexual conduct between spomes should 
not be a matter for state concern. 
Subsection (3) concerning penitentiary confinement 
subsequent to marriage has also been clarified so that 
it now requires conviction of a felony, more than 
one year's sentence, and subsequent confinement with-
out cohabitation after knowledge of such confinement. 
r n suhsection (6), cruelty and reasonable apprehen-
sion of hodily hurt are for the first time introduced 
into this Section covering grounds for absolute di-
vorce. Previously, they were named only as grounds 
for a divorce a mensa hut were judicially treated as 
"constructive desertion" alter the lapse of the statu-
torily prescribed onc year waiting period. Such con-
structive desertion was thus held a ground for absolute 
divorce under this subsection which formerly covered 
explicitly only desertion or abandonment. 
The new wording of subsection (6) provides that 
an ahsolute divorce may be decreed "after a period 
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of one year from the date of such act [of either 
desertion or cruelty]." Obviously, it was intended to 
legislatively overrule the fornler case law that held 
that desertion must be continuous for the required 
statutory period and that the offending party had a 
right to return during the waiting period whieh reo 
turn would bar a divorce.~ Such legislative intent is 
consistent with the judicial interpretation of the last 
ground for divorce listed in subsection 20-91 (9 ), i.e. 
separation for one year or no-fault divorce. The ju. 
dicial interpretation of legislative intent as to the 
separation ground has been that fault is not to be 
considered a factor and that a divorce should be 
granted after the statutorily prescribed period even 
if the original separation was not mutually voluntary 
but in fact amounted to desertion.s Both the cruelty 
and desertion ground and the separation or no-fault 
ground now require only one year's living apart. ThU5) 
consistency requires the overturning of the old case 
law on desertion, since a spouse who alleges desertion 
as grounds should not be required to take the offendcr 
back during the statutory period if there is no such 
requirement in the case of separation. 
Most important, subsection 9 covering the separa· 
tion or no-fault ground has been revised so that the 
statutory period has been cut from two years to one 
year, as stated previously. Also, the three paragrapru 
of the subsection have been newly labeled (a), (b), 
and (c), and new paragraph (c) formerly providing 
that reliance on this ground for divorce could not in 
any way lessen any obligation of support to a wifc 
has been made sexually neutral as to the possibility of 
such support. 
Several less important changes have been made in 
succeeding sections. Section 20-94 covering the effect 
of cohabitation after knowledge of adultery has been 
extended to apply to sodomy and huggery as well and 
to bar action by the party alleging such act rather 
than "the plaintiff" a<; fonnedy, provided procurement 
or connivance can be shown. Section 20-95 covering 
divorces a mensa now specifies "wilful" desertion in 
line with similar changes in Section 20-9 1. Section 
20-99 now extends the requirement of corroboration 
of the parties' testimony to suits for annulment and 
affirmation as well as for divorce. Section 20-101 
requiring that the divorce decree show the race of the 
parties has heen repealed, and changes to 20-102 
make it no longer necessary to prove an offer of recon· 
5Wrightv. Wright. 125 Va. 526 ( 1919 ). 
I) Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744 (1965). 
ciliation in a divorce suit for "wilful" desertion. 
Furthermore, Section 20-103 granting the court au-
thority to order support payments pending suit has 
been made sexually neutral, and Section 20- 104 re-
garding orders of publication against nonresident 
defendants has been extended to make such service 
availahle in suits for affirmance of marriage. 
However, major revision has occurred regarding 
Section 20-107. Generally, this section providing that 
the court may decree regarding the estate and main-
tenance of the partie~, custody of children, and re-
sumption of a former name ha.~ been rendered sex-
ually neutral. The word "alimony" ha5 again been 
replaced by "support and maintenance of the spouse" 
throughout. Moreover, new language appended to the 
section lists six specific factors for courts to consider 
in detcrmining support and maintenance either for the 
other spouse or children . These are as follows: 
( 1) the earning capacity, ohligations and 
needs, and financial resources of the parties; 
(2) the education and training of the parties 
and the ability and opportunity of the parties 
to secure such education and training; 
(3) the standard of living established dur-
ing marriage; 
(4) the duration of the marriage; 
(5) the age, physical and mental condition 
of the parties; 
(6) such other factors as are necessary to 
consider the equities hetween the parties. 
Provided, however, that no permanent sup-
port and maintenance for the spouse shall be 
awarded by the court from a spouse if there 
exists in his or her favor a ground for divorce 
under any provision of §§ 20-91 ( 1) through 
(8) or 20-95 [fault grounds for either divorce 
a mensa or a vinculo J. 
This language is in accord with the prior state case 
law regarding the award of alimony and support and 
appears to bc sufficiently comprehensive. 
Several other sections have been revised to reAect 
the new support and maintenance terminology as 
applied to the spouse, including Sections 20-109 re-
garding changes in support and 20-110 covering ces-
sation of such payments upon remarriage. Section 
20-1 12, regarding notice when proceedings are to be 
reopened, has been made applicable to support for 
a spouse as well as children, and now explicitly state~ 
that reopening may be for the purpose of increasing, 
decreasing, or terminating any such payments. 
Other sections which have been rendered sexually 
neutral and have suhstituted the teml maintenance 
and support for the spouse in place of alimony in-
clude: §§ 20-113 (respondent fails to perform order 
for support and maintenance); 20-114 (reco1-,'l1 izance 
may be refJuired for compliance with order) ; 20-11.1) 
(commitment and sentence for failure to comply ); 
and 20-122 (advertising offer to ohtain divorce). In 
addition, Sections 20-121, (merger of divorce a mensa 
with divorce a vinculo ) and 20-121 (decree a vinculo 
without divorce a mensa) have been revised to reAect 
the new explicit requirement of "wilful" desertion. 
Significantly, Section 20-119 has been repealed. 
It formerly permitled courts to restrain a party guilty 
of adultery from remarrying whcre adultery was the 
ground of the divorce. This change gocs along with 
the general liberalization of grounds for divorce oc-
curring in recent years in the successive shortening of 
the statutory periods for divorce and the nation-wide 
trend away from 'fault ideas I'egarding marital break-
down.7 
In general, the Virginia General Assemhly should 
be congratulated for having accomplished this year a 
comprehensive and progressive revision of the do-
mestic relations law of the state. 
70ne·third of the statcs ha ve adopted no·fault grounds 
for divorce based on "llTctrievable breakdovm" or "mecon· 
cilable differences" between 1970 and 1974. 
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